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Addressing Relief and Repatriation Needs in 
Nongovernment-Held Areas: 
Implications for Policies and Programs 
Gayle E. Smith 
This paper will examine the existingcon- 
straints to addressing relief and repatria- 
tion needs in nongovernment-held areas 
and point to areas of possible change. 
Nongovernment-held areas are held by a 
force other than a central government 
army. In the case of Tigray, these areas 
were not only inaccessible to the army of 
the former central government of Ethio- 
pia (GOE), but were also administered 
by an opposition force, theTigrayan Peo- 
ple's Liberation Front (TPLF). Relative to 
other national liberation movements, the 
TPLF's administrative system was quite 
developed; in addition, the movement 
controlled a wide area encompassing 
most of rural Tigray and, by 1988, the 
whole of the region. Effective access was 
maintained from neighbouring Sudan, 
and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) 
operated as an effective disaster man- 
agement agency. 
Structural Constraints 
There are four primary structural con- 
straints to working in nongovernment- 
held areas, as experienced during the 
198485 famine in Ethiopia. The first and 
most sigruficant of these is the fad that 
the United Nations plays the role of lead 
agency in both international disaster re- 
sponse and repatriation programs. How- 
ever, because the UN is comprised of 
member governments and its member 
agencies are thus required to deal solely 
with host governments, UN agencies are 
structurally prohibited from accessing 
nongovernment-held areas, except in 
cases (such as southern Sudan) where 
the member government gives its ap- 
proval. This structural limitation was not 
generally a problem during the post- 
World War II era when most conflicts 
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were between states. However, in to- 
days environment, most conflicts are 
internal, or between a recognized (and 
UN member) state and an unrecognized 
opposition movement. As such, the abil- 
ity of UN agencies to respond in conflict 
situations has been sharply constrained 
in recent years. 
In the case of Ethiopia, approval for 
UN involvement in guerrilla-adminis- 
tered areas was denied throughout the 
emergency period. In fact, the GOE did 
not acknowledge the existence of armed 
conflict in Tigray or in the Red Sea tem- 
tory of Eritrea until 1989, and throughout 
the crisis period maintained that it had 
complete and unrestricted access to all 
areas of Ethiopia (including Eritrea). As 
such, the UN was unable to design alter- 
native programs, such as Operation Life- 
line in Sudan, or to address dvilian needs 
in these areas. 
The primary problem that arose for 
practitioners in the Ethiopian case was 
not that the UN was unable to work in 
Tigray or to respond effectively to the 
repatriation program for Tigrayan refu- 
gees returning to TPLF areas, but that it 
maintained its role as lead agency de- 
spite its inability to properly fulfil this 
role. Similarly, most members of the in- 
ternational aid community continued to 
defer to UNHCRasaleadagency despite 
the conflicting realities on the ground. As 
a consequence, efforts to respond to the 
famine inside Tigray, as well as to the 
needs of refugees returning to Tiiay, 
were coordinated by and around an 
agency that was unable to gain physical 
access to the &is area or even to engage 
in dialogue with the local authorities (in 
this case TPLF) from those areas. 
The second structural constraint de- 
rives from what can be called the "sec- 
ond tier" of the international 
humanitarian architecture, or the bilat- 
eral aid agencies. As most governments 
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make clear, bilateral aid programs are 
often guided by foreign policy objectives. 
In the case of Ethiopia, these objectives 
were substantial. During the period un- 
der consideration, President Reagan had 
just announced the "Reagan Doctrine," 
of which Ethiopia was a component; 
Western governments were pursuing a 
policy of attempting to seduce the 
Mengistu regime away from the Soviet 
Union with emergency assistance that 
Moscow could not provide; these gov- 
ernments were enjoying access to Addis 
Ababa that had been denied for some 
seven years; the majority of Western gov- 
ernments maintained a clear policy 
against self-determination for Eritrea, 
which the TPLF supported; the TPLF's 
policies on the ground were unknown to 
most bilateral donors, who instead fo- 
cused on what was perceived as its Mam- 
side of the border where the Tigrayans 
could be defined as refugees. Bilateral 
aid agencies provided no direct support 
to the program. 
In this case, it was international 
NGOs who attempted to fill the gaps. 
Unrestricted by either mandate or for- 
eign policy agendas, NGOs maintained 
sufficient flexibility to allow them to sup- 
port both the repatriation program as 
well as cross-border relief programs in- 
side guerrilla-held areas. However, de- 
spite this flexibility, the international 
NGO community operated at a distinct 
disadvantage, which posed the third 
structural constraint in terms of interna- 
tionalresponse. A number of factors con- 
tributed to this: as a sector, international 
NGOs are not united and in fact compete 
for resources and programming options; 
within the NGO community, there is a 
With the UN constrained by mandate and bilateral aid 
agencies opemting on the basis of foreign policy 
objectives, signijkant gaps emerged. 
ist-Leninist character; and the United 
States, Israel and Sudan were then en- 
gaged in a covert operation along the 
Sudanese-Ethiopian border to evacuate 
Ethiopian Jews to Israel. Each of these 
policy trends were against supporting 
cross-border relief operations into 
nongovernment-held areas of Tigray 
(and Eritrea) and led some governments 
to actively lobby against flexibility on the 
part of UNHCR vis-a-vis the Tigrayan 
refugee repatriation. 
With t h e w  constrained by mandate 
and bilateral aid agencies operating on 
the basis of foreign policy objectives, sig- 
nificant gaps emerged. Relief assistance 
provided to nongovernment-held areas 
was sigruficantly less than what was re- 
quired, and was proportionally less than 
what was provided by the international 
community to civilians living in areas 
accessible to the GOE. With respect to the 
repatriation program, similar gaps 
emerged; UNHCR provided little assist- 
ance in the first phases and additional 
assistance as the program developed, but 
this was provided only on the Sudanese 
diversity of expertise and, in some cases, 
a lackof the technical capacityto respond 
effectively; many international NGOs 
are to some extent dependent upon, and 
thus influenced by, donor governments; 
and, finally, NGOs represent the weak- 
est link in the international aid chain. 
Although a relatively small group of 
NGOs identified a viable alternative ap- 
proach to meeting the needs of civilians 
in nongovernment-held areas-by 
supporting both cross-border and the 
repatriation program inside non- 
government-held areas-they were in- 
capable of enforcing or expanding this 
approach within the aid community. In 
fact, NGOs working in nongovernment- 
held areas were consistently excluded 
from policy and planning forums con- 
vened by the UN and bilateral govern- 
ment agencies, and their information and 
experience was not included in reports 
or analyses developed by, for example, 
t h e w  Office for Emergency Operations 
in Africa, which coordinated the interna- 
tional response to Ethiopia. Operating 
with limited resources, international 
NGOs attempted, but failed, to fill the 
gaps created by the structure of the inter- 
national aid system. 
The fourth structural constraint rel- 
evant to the Tigrayan repatriation was 
the fact that the refugees themselves 
were afforded no mechanism for repre- 
sentation. While REST was able to speak 
on behalf of the refugees, the organiza- 
tion was denied access to policy- and 
program-related decision makingby UN 
and bilateral agencies, and was only able 
to participate in occasional discussions 
related to operations. This posed consid- 
erable problems, particularly with re- 
spect to the determination of the 
"voluntary" nature of the repatriation 
and of the extent to which fundamental 
change had taken place in the area of 
origin. Based on what they viewed to be 
the best interests of the refugees, the 
majority of donors determined that the 
repatriation was not viable and should 
not proceed, primarily because famine 
was still extensive in Tigray. By contrast, 
the refugees actively wished to return to 
Tigray in time to cultivate their land. 
Conceptual Constraints 
An effective international response was 
also constrained by conceptual problems 
within the aid community. Among these 
was the misidentification of push and 
pull factors affecting the Tigrayan refu- 
gees. Some seven million Ethiopians 
were affected by the famine of 1984-85; 
only selected populations sought refuge 
in Sudan. These were civilians living in 
nongovernment-held areas of Tigray 
and Eritrea who, because of the structure 
of the international aid system and, in 
particular, the inability of UN agencies to 
provide assistance into these areas, re- 
ceived inadequate emergency assist- 
ance. Fearful of entering the 
government-held towns where interna- 
tional assistance was available (due to 
the risk of forced resettlement, conscrip- 
tion into the Ethiopian army or the possi- 
ble denial of rations), these people opted 
to walk to Sudan in order to qualify as 
refugees and thus obtain international 
assistance that was unavailable in their 
areas of origin. Most of these refugees 
had lived under conditions of war for at 
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least a decade, and had not, until the 
autumn of 1984, opted for out-migration. 
Nonetheless, most donor agencies 
assumed that the push factors were fam- 
ine and, secondarily, war. When the 
Tigrayan refugees voiced a desire to be 
repatriated, donors countered that both 
famine and war still posed considerable 
problems in Tigray, and that conse- 
quently there was insufficient funda- 
mental change to warrant a return. 
However, the refugees were prepared to 
return because conditions in the Suda- 
nese camps were poor, the migratory 
system had provided them with suste- 
nance and a respite, there had been a 
slight increase in the assistance available 
within Tigray, and alsobecause the repa- 
triation program provided them with the 
means to return to production in time for 
the cultivation season. 
This difference in conceptual think- 
ing was also coloured by varying defini- 
tions and understandings of famine and 
famine response. From REST'S point of 
view, famine was primarily an economic 
phenomenon whereby the rural popula- 
tion had been rendered increasingly vul- 
nerable to disaster agents such as 
drought. As vulnerability increased, 
peasants sold their productive assets 
and, as a survival mechanism, migrated 
in search of food. The objective of the 
response was not simply to provide food 
to fend off starvation, but also to provide 
farmers simultaneously with the rudi- 
mentary means of production. By con- 
trast, most donors viewed famine as the 
consequence of drought and, thus, food 
aid as the primary means of response. 
This conceptual gap was exacerbated by 
the fact that relief is most often viewed in 
isolation from rehabilitation or develop- 
ment; as such, REST'S attempt to provide 
a dual response in its relief and repatria- 
tion programs-that is, to prevent star- 
vation while at the same time 
rehabilitatingproductive capacity-was 
not understood or supported by most 
donors. 
The third and, perhaps, most signifi- 
cant conceptual divergence occurred at 
the level of politics. Despite the fad that 
the war in Tigray was waged between 
the GOE and the TPLF, and despite the 
fact that REST and the GOE's Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) as- 
sumed parallel responsibilities, REST 
and TPLF were perceived as more politi- 
cal than their government counterparts. 
This was in part due to the fact that the 
international aid system bears a distinct 
bias towards states andbecause, asa con- 
sequence, there was an "official" relief 
operation (in coordination with the 
GOE) and an "unofficial" relief opera- 
tion (cross-border from Sudan through 
REST and, in the case of Eritrea, through 
the Eritrean Relief Association). One was 
recognized and the others were not. 
The definitional disparity was made 
manifest in policy- and program-related 
decision making at the international 
level, where neither REST norTPLF were 
allowed access. In fact, neither the UN 
signed in such a way as to prevent the 
accrual of undue military advantage on 
the part of either of the contending ar- 
mies. In the case of Ethiopia, however, 
the bias of the aid system towards the 
state skewed the concept of neutrality in 
such a manner that it was viewed as re- 
spect for the state or official side of the 
conflict and relief operation. Promoting 
assistance to nongovernment-held areas 
was most commonly viewed as political 
rather than as an attempt to promote 
parity. Neutrality was often used as the 
argument for not discussing or respond- 
ing to needs in nongovernment-held ar- 
eas. From the viewpoint of the civilians 
living in nongovernment-held areas, 
their resultant nonexistence was per- 
ceived as partiality in favour of the GOE. 
. . . the bias of the aid system towards the state skewed the concept 
of neutrality in such a manner that it was viewed as respect for 
the stnfe or oncia1 side of the conflct and relief opermion. 
nor bilateral government agencies main- 
tained communications with both par- 
ties to the conflict, and instead 
maintained relations only with the GOE. 
Again, one was "official," and thereby 
"acceptable" at the level of international 
interaction, while the other was not. This 
resulted in a common assumption, when 
relief efforts were impeded by the con- 
flict, that REST and TPLF were "guilty 
until proven innocent," while the GOE 
was "innocent until proven guilty." On 
the numerous occasions when the relief 
system became a direct victim of conflict 
(road blockages, attacks on relief con- 
voys or relief centres), the international 
community failed to promote account- 
ability on an equal basis, instead of hold- 
ing the opposition to higher standards 
than the GOE. This lackof parity wasalso 
expressed in terms of reporting and 
monitoring requirements, which were 
more extensive for REST and ERA than 
for their GOE counterpart. 
Neutrality was also a concept that 
provoked differing views. My own view 
is that neutrality is not, in fact, possible 
when intervening in a conflict situation. 
"Even-handedness" might be possible 
as a goal, if in fad interventions are de- 
A genuinely neutral position would have 
argued in favour of giving civilians in 
government and nongovernment-held 
areas equal access to international assist- 
ance; " even-handedness" would have 
resulted in an attempt to provide assist- 
ance in this fashion. In reality, unfortu- 
nately, neutrality meant not taking a 
position at all and, consequently, the fail- 
ure of the international community to 
attempt the more attainable "even- 
handedness." 
Both structural and conceptual limi- 
tations affected relief operations. Coor- 
dination was the primary problem in this 
area. Throughout the famine crisis in 
Ethiopia, there was no coordination be- 
tween aid agencies working on the gov- 
ernment side and those working on the 
nongovemment side. This resulted in a 
problematic disparity in terms of infor- 
mation and analysis, and prohibited the 
international community from identify- 
ing the best means of reaching all civil- 
ians in need. At the same time, the 
sourcing of information-and thus plan- 
ning-was skewed in favour of official 
GOE data. UNHCR, for example, was 
unable to operate on thebasis of informa- 
tion obtained fromREST, despite the fad 
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that REST was in a position to provide 
accurate information regarding popula- 
tion migrations into Sudan in such a 
manner as to allow for effective advance 
planning. Figures regarding total popu- 
lation, as well as numbers in need and 
response, were widely divergent. 
Parallel to the conceptual constraint 
posed by divergent understandings of 
famine was the fact that relief and devel- 
opment actors were divided. Develop- 
ment agencies had little knowledge of 
relief and, in general, held relief agencies 
in contempt. On the other hand, relief 
agencies tended to operate without the 
economic perspective maintained by the 
development agencies. Promoting the 
dual response approach taken by REST 
was made extremely difficult by the fact 
that one had to speak to different staff 
members within the same aid agencies, 
and by the fact that their responses were 
not coordinated with one another. 
The most significant operational con- 
straint, however, arose from the fact that 
the majority of aid agencies responding 
to the famine crisis had little or no knowl- 
edge of military theory or strategy de- 
spite the fact that they were intervening 
in the midst of a major armed conflict. It 
is my argument that any economic inter- 
vention-whether it be relief or develop- 
mental-in a conflict situation will have 
a bearing on that conflict. This was made 
clear most explicitly when the relief sys- 
tem came under attack; at a more subtle 
level, however, relief interventions af- 
fected the capacities and strategies of the 
contending armies. Infrastructure was 
developed; assistance that determined 
whether populations shifted from one 
operational area to another was made 
available in large quantities; the abilities 
of both armies to deliver to their constitu- 
encies was affected. At the operational 
level, however, most practitioners failed 
to duly examine the relationship be- 
tween their interventions and the con- 
flicts, and thus to ensure-as far as 
possible--that undue military advan- 
tage was not accrued by either party. 
The balance of power was also af- 
fected. This posed considerable contro- 
versy within the aid community, which, 
as outlined earlier, suffered from an in- 
appropriate view of neutrality. At the 
outset of major international aid inter- 
vention, roughly 60 percent of those ci- 
vilians affected by famine resided in 
nongovernment-held areas. Interna- 
tional assistance was allocated in such a 
fashion that civilians living in govern- 
ment-held areas were initially provided 
with 90 percent of all assistance, leaving 
civilians on the wrong side of the lines at 
a distinct disadvantage. The aoss-bor- 
der operations, while sigruficant, failed 
to redress this imbalance, and instead 
shifted the ration to only 2090 (still in 
favour of civilians in government-held 
areas). Despite the fact that the balance 
remained skewed, cross-border agencies 
were often viewed as "supporting" the 
TPLF (and Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front [EPLF] in Eritrea) and shifting the 
held areas. This is only true in cases 
where the member government in ques- 
tion denies the existence of conflict or 
denies the UN access to conflict areas, 
however. In the case of southem Sudan, 
the government of Sudan has allowed 
UNICEF access (albeit with considerable 
obstacles), so UNICEF is to some extent 
capable of addressing civilian needs. 
In cases where the UN is unable to 
operate on the basis of parity and com- 
plete access to information, it is impossi- 
ble for UNHCR to determine either the 
voluntary nature of a repatriation or the 
extent of fundamental change within the 
area of origin. At the wider level, the UN 
is unable to accurately assessneeds or the 
effectiveness of the international re- 
sponse. Also in these cases, the UN is 
At the wider level, the UN is unable to accurately assess needs or 
the eflectiveness of the international response . . . the UN is 
restricted fmm responding to indigenous alternatives that may 
emerge on nongovernment-held areas. 
balance. It is true that cross-border inter- 
ventions affected the political and mili- 
tary capacities of the movements. It is 
also true that aid intervention on the gov- 
ernment side strengthened the military 
and policy capacity of the Ethiopian 
army and government. It is not accurate, 
however, to argue that cross-border 
operations lent undue advantage to the 
liberationmovements; in fact, despite the 
fact that assistance was provided into 
these areas, the movements still oper- 
ated at a loss in terms of advantage 
gained by the relief effort. 
Lessons from the Ethiopian 
Experience 
Based on the Ethiopian experience, one 
can draw certain conclusions, some of 
which may be relevant to other cases of 
aid intervention in nongovernment-held 
areas. First is the fact that the mandates of 
UN agencies prevents them from play- 
ingan eff ective and even-handed coordi- 
nating or operational role, as they do not 
have appropriate mechanisms for ob- 
taining information from all sources or 
for gaining access to nongovernment- 
restricted from responding to indig- 
enous alternatives that may emerge on 
nongovemment-held areas. One of the 
greatest tragedies of the 1984-85 famine, 
and in particular, the repatriation of 
Tigrayan refugees, was that the UN and 
other agencies were unable to take ad- 
vantage of the opportunities provided 
by REST'S effectiveness and the exist- 
ence of a well-organized (and self-organ- 
ized) refugee population. 
Perceptions of neutrality defined on 
the basis of a bias towards the state lead 
to an absence rather than the promotion 
of even-handedness. This, in turn, can 
lead to a dangerous lack of confidence in 
the international system on the part of 
the civilians it is mandated to serve. In 
the case of Ethiopia, this loss of confi- 
dence coloured later efforts by the UN to 
address needs in nongovernment-held 
areas, i.e., the World Food Programme's 
(WFP) negotiations to reopen the port of 
Massawa after it came under EPLF con- 
trol and UNICEF's attempts to under- 
take an immunization program in 
nongovernment-held areas of Eritrea 
and Tigray. 
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Significantly, we can conclude that 
given the prevailing situation, interna- 
tional NGOs can fill gaps created by the 
inability of other aid actors to respond 
effectively in nongovernment-held ar- 
eas. This being said, it must be pointed 
out that this flexibility remains 
underutilized and that the nature of 
NGO response in these situations re- 
mains ad hoc and dependent upon the 
will of individual agencies. In other 
words, thereis noguarantee that interna- 
tional NGOs will fill these gaps or will do 
so effectively. At the same time, it must 
be understood that responding in 
nongovernment-held areas poses risks 
for NGO institutions. Given the unoffi- 
cial status of these areas and of their au- 
thorities (liberation movements), NGOs 
that relief operations in conflict situa- 
tions can provide a pretext for small- 
scale and limited objective negotiations 
and, in some cases, provide a basis for 
conflict resolution. 
Short- and Long-Term Change 
It is cllear that the international system 
has yet to devise an effective means of 
responding effectively in non- 
government-held areas. In the short 
term, there are a number of changes that 
can be made. First and foremost is the 
adoption of a division of labour 
approach, whereby it is acknowledged 
that the traditional UN-coordinated and 
bilateral-dominated approach cannot 
work effectively. At that stage, the crisis 
can be essentially mapped out, identify- 
. . . working in nongovernment-held areas requires a 
considerable discretion so as not to alienate or antagonize the 
central government or the government that is allowing access to 
the nongovernrnent-held areas of a neighbouring country. 
often become vehicles for articulating 
needs and realities in these areas and are 
thus labelled as "political." 
On a more positive note, we can 
conclude from the Ethiopian experience 
that continued intervention in non- 
government-held areas can lay the foun- 
dation for coordinated and more 
effective negotiated efforts. In the late 
1980s, for example, the Joint Relief Part- 
nership was negotiated between REST 
and Ethiopian church agencies to allow 
the delivery of assistance to civilians on 
both sides of the lines. Some months 
later, the WFPwasable tonegotiatebilat- 
erally with the EPLF and the GOE to 
reopen the port of Massawa and to use 
the port for providing assistance to civil- 
ians in government and nongovern- 
ment-held areas. While these were 
positivedevelopments, however, it must 
be pointed out that proposals for the safe 
passage of relief supplies (and move- 
ment of relief personnel) put forward by 
the TPLF and EPLF (in 1983 and 1984, 
respectively) failed to generate negotia- 
tions, largely because the GOE at that 
time maintained that peace prevailed 
throughout the country. The Ethiopian 
example aside, the relevant fact here is 
ing populations in need and possible 
means of access. Resources can be allo- 
cated on the basis of which agencies are 
able to respond in specific areas; in other 
words, UN agencies would target gov- 
ernment-held areas, while bilateral agen- 
cies would allocate their assistance 
primarily to those areas or, given policy 
considerations, to other areas of their 
choosing. Most nongovernment-held 
areas would become the responsibility of 
international NGOs who would 
necessarily be forced to improve coordi- 
nation and collaboration among them- 
selves. 
It should be noted that in most cases, 
working in nongovernment-held areas 
requires a considerable discretion so as 
not to alienate or antagonize the central 
government or the government that is 
allowing access to the nongovemment- 
held areas of a neighbouring country. 
This discretion must be maintained for 
obvious reasons. However, discretion at 
the expense of coordination-as was the 
case in Ethiopia-is detrimental, as it 
prevents the cooperation necessary to 
ensure that all civilian needs are ad- 
dressed or that they all have equal access 
to international assistance. 
Access and use of information can 
also be improved. While UN agencies 
may be restricted from operating in 
nongovernment-held areas, it may still 
be possible for them to gather informa- 
tion from these areas and to include it in 
planning and analysis. If that is not pos- 
sible, it may be necessary to identify an 
alternative information coordinator; the 
salient point here is that effective re- 
sponse in a conflict situation and, in par- 
ticular, ensuring adequate response in 
nongovernment-held areas, requires 
that the international community oper- 
ate on the basis of a comprehensive infor- 
mation base and not, as was the case in 
Ethiopia, on the basis of distinct and 
nonintegrated pieces of the picture. 
Third and also important is coordina- 
tion that fills gaps in meeting crisis needs 
that may arise. This should be the objec- 
tive of coordination at large, but in most 
disasters minor emergencies regularly 
occur and require quick responses. 
Those agencies capable of responding to 
these minor crises must be identified in 
advance and prepared to respond with 
speed. 
In the longer term, the increase in the 
incidence of human need in non- 
government-held areas poses the ques- 
tion of reexamining the mandates of UN 
and other international aid agencies, in- 
cluding the International Committee of 
the Red Cross. This, in turn, provokes 
considerable debate surrounding the 
wisdom and viability of humanitarian 
intervention and the nature of national 
sovereignty. While this paper cannot 
address these significant debates, the 
Ethiopian experience pointed to the pos- 
sibility of devolving responsibility in 
these matters to the regional level. Sig- 
nificantly, the governments of the Horn 
of Africa convened a regional summit on 
humanitarian issues in April 1992 in 
which there was a consensus on the need 
for cross-border operations, coordina- 
tion of refugee migrations and 
repatriations, and the protection of relief 
goods and relief personnel. While the 
regional governments' willingness and 
ability to fulfil the pledges made at the 
summit remain to be seen, the summit 
has provided, in this region, a basis for 
overcoming obstacles posed by govem- 
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ments and for increased and balanced 
accountability. 
Related to the reexamination of man- 
dates is the issue of cross-border opera- 
tions, which are commonly undertaken 
on an ad hoc basis and for which there is 
no formal mechanism in the interna- 
tional aid system. While the issue of na- 
tional sovereignty and its potential 
manipulation would likely suggest the 
imprudence of formalizing cross-border 
response, there is now ample experience 
from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Afghani- 
stan and other regions to warrant further 
examination and analysis that might 
inform the future effectiveness of cross- 
border operations into nongovernment- 
held areas. 
It is also necessary, in the longer term, 
to create structural linkages between re- 
lief response on the one hand, and reha- 
bilitation and development response on 
the other. This is true with respect to 
government and nongovernment-held 
areas, and also true in cases where con- 
flict is not a factor. This need is particu- 
larly clear in the case of repatriation, 
where reintegration is not as yet a 
responsibility of any international 
agency and which, as a consequence, can 
have the effect of preventing viable 
repatriations from taking place (as in the 
case of the repatriation of Eritrean refu- 
gees from Sudan). In nongovernment- 
held areas, linking these two issues and 
promoting a dual response also requires 
overcoming the conceptual gap regard- 
ing the potential for development in 
conflicts. In the Ethiopian case, most do- 
nors argued that rehabilitation and de- 
velopment were not viable in 
nongovemment-held areas (active war 
zones) while the war was still going on. 
Development programs were under- 
taken in government-held areas. In con- 
trast, there wasn't a single Ethiopian who 
was prepared to wait until the end of the 
war to improve his or her economic 
standing. "Development" continued, re- 
gardless of the extent of international 
support for it. 
Finally, working in nongovemment- 
held areas requires due consideration of 
the politicalimpact of such interventions. 
In any relief intervention, infrastructure, 
distribution and economic viability are 
generally improved. Ina situationof con- 
flict, this has political dimensions that 
must be gauged carefully to ensure that 
the political balance is not unduly af- 
fected. 
In a nongovernment-held area, the 
local authority-and thus one of thepart- 
ners-is most often a liberation move- 
ment with political and military aims. In 
some cases, there might be an organiza- 
tion such as REST that allows for a sepa- 
ration between aid intervenors and the 
liberation movement itself, but rarely are 
such organizations as distinct and effec- 
tive as REST. In any case, however, it is 
important to acknowledge that aid inter- 
ventions will affect the liberation move- 
ments' political and military capaaties, 
since most liberation movements adopt 
a guerrilla strategy whereby gaining the 
In a situation of conflict, 
[relief intervention] has 
political dimensions that 
must be gauged carefilly to 
ensure that the political 
balance is not unduly 
affected. 
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allegiance of civilians (i.e., the target 
population for aid intervenors) is critical. 
It is the same when working in govern- 
ment-held areas where, in the case of 
guerrilla warfare, the goal is to drain 
liberation movements of their popular 
support. 
This does not imply that aid 
intervenors should make a political de- 
termination of the "good" or "bad" na- 
ture of the liberation movement, or that 
they should take a political stance in the 
conflict. It does mean, however, that due 
consideration must be given to operation 
methodology and the extent to which 
institution-building can or should be 
promoted. This, in turn, requires consid- 
ering the efficiency, level of community 
support and organization, degree of ad- 
herence to internationally-accepted hu- 
manitarian principles, balance of power 
and social motivations extant in a 
nongovernment-held area. In the case of 
Tigray, for example, most NGOs felt that 
REST was suffiaently autonomous from 
TPLF, suffiaently rooted in the commu- 
nity and sufficiently geared towards 
genuine social development objectives 
to warrant supporting a lesser degree of 
operationality on the part of the interna- 
tional NGOs and to warrant deliberate 
support for capacity-building. In other 
cases, this may be less desirable (as in the 
case of the MozambiqueNational Resist- 
ance or the Khmer Rouge, for example). 
This last point is one that is likely to 
spark controversy. Again, it is important 
to stress that it is neither necessary nor 
advisable to pass judgement on the lib- 
eration movement's political nature or 
objectives, as the objective is to address 
civilians' needs despite the constraints 
imposed by the political or military envi- 
ronment. It is important to accept the fad 
that aid intervention in a conflict situa- 
tion implies, necessarily, some degree of 
involvement in that conflict, whether it 
be in government or nongovernment- 
held areas, for aid is both a potential 
weapon of war and agent of political 
change in the eyes of the conflicting par- 
ties. 
Given this fact, it is critical that aid 
intervenors tailor their methodologies to 
ensure that civilians' needs are met 
effectively and with even-handedness. 
This, in turn, requires careful considera- 
tion of the degree of operationality as- 
sumed by the external aid agency, which 
must be weighed against attempts to 
build local capacity to manage disasters 
on the one hand, and the need to ensure 
the independence of relief operations 
from political agendas on the other. This 
also requires examining the degree to 
which institution-building is advisable 
and how it should be undertaken. In the 
final analysis, it must be acknowledged 
that when we intervene in a conflict situ- 
ation, we essentially abandon our neu- 
trality, for our assistance becomes part of 
the conflict. Our goal should be achiev- 
ing the greatest possible even- 
handedness. We should not avoid 
politics because we are humanitarians, 
but we should enhance our ability to 
operate as humanitarians by maintain- 
ing continued awareness of the funda- 
mentally political environment in which 
we are operating. 
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